Necessitarian accounts of the laws of nature have an apparent difficulty in ac- 
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to defend some of those philosophers who advocate the apparently melodramatic thesis that at least some of the laws are metaphysically necessary. In particular, I am concerned with Dispositional Essentialists (Disposi-falsehood, and their ignorance of the chemical constitution of water. Given the alchemist thinks water is elemental, and has no constituents, a fortiori she would assent to:
() It is not the case that, necessarily, hydrogen is a constituent of water.
And given (), it is very plausible to think that () is true. In effect, being ignorant of a metaphysical necessity about the constitution of water facilitates belief in the contingency of a particular law. Conversely, if one knows that water is necessarily H 2 O (and therefore that () is false) one should be inclined -argues the Dispositionalist -to believe that () is false. The Dispositionalist might argue for this as follows:
If something is necessarily a compound of A and B, yet cannot possibly engage in a reaction that yields A, then it is doubtful what is meant by the claim that it is a compound. Better to insist that being a compound entails being chemically decomposable into one's elemental constituents. Given that water is necessarily H 2 O, it is also a necessary truth that it is capable of reacting to produce hydrogen.⁵ In a spirit of maximum charity, though, we may try to point out what is right about the alchemist's assertions above. Recall that Kripke contrasted some otherostensibly epistemic -species of possibility with metaphysical possibility:
Gold apparently has the atomic number . Is it a necessary or a contingent property of gold that it has the atomic number ? Certainly we could find out that we were mistaken.⁶ Along similar lines, we could say that the alchemist is correct to think that: (  ) It could turn out that water lacks the power to be a reagent in the production of hydrogen.
And:
(  ) It could turn out that hydrogen is not a constituent of water.
These claims are prima facie true, and do not offend against the central tenet of Dispositionalism. How can this technique of generous translation help us in the case of counterlegals, then? . It is by no means necessary that the Dispositionalist subscribe to this argument, it merely provides a useful heuristic to introduce the semantic treatment of counterfactuals that follows.
. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard UP, ), p. , emphasis added.

The alchemist was led into modal error about the law-like proposition () because of her ignorance about the constitution of water. Analogously, the Dispositionalist may suggest that there is widespread ignorance about the truth of various metaphysical theses about the nature of the fundamental properties. For example, the Dispositionalist claims it is true that:
() Mass is essentially such that it confers upon its bearers the causal power to attract other masses in accordance with an inverse square law.
But this is hardly a well-entrenched platitude of folk physics. Indeed, there is a relatively widespread intuition that the laws governing mass could have been otherwise, and this implies that there is at least a tacit disbelief in ().
Like the alchemist, though, the modal intuitions of these Contingentists con- Supposing the world does turn out to conform to HS, would it then be the case that there are no laws, that there is no causation, etc? Perhaps some anti-Humeans are of the radical view that we should be error theorists about such concepts if HS turns out to be true. But those philosophers are hardly likely to have been worried
 by the threat of vacuous counterlegal conditionals -the threat which motivates this paper. Evidently they would be prepared to declare such vast tracts of folkdiscourse false or vacuous if HS turned out to be true that they should be little perturbed if, on the supposition that Dispositionalism is true, merely counterlegal conditionals were rendered vacuous.
It is to the less strident anti-Humean, then, that my argument is directed. And for those philosophers, if HS turns out to be true then the laws are presumably something like cosmic regularities, for that is the gist of what all neo-Humean philosophers say they are. Consequently, the laws would turn out to be contingent.
There is, then, at least one way the world could have turned out such that the laws of nature would be contingent.
To the utterer of the vacuous counterlegal (), then, we may attribute the presupposition that things will turn out such that the laws of nature are contingent. suggest, is that in evaluating 'if it turns out that' conditionals, we are concerned  to restrict the number of different types of change which occur between the actual world and the counteractual scenario.
So for instance, if we start from an antecedent which involves a change in the laws, then we are relatively content to accept that there may turn out to be other changes in law-like phenomena, but we are relatively loath to change particular facts. Having admitted that gravity has turned out otherwise, we can readily countenance another change in the fundamental laws to account for the apparent orbits. It would be worse and messier to suppose that, in addition to a change in the laws, that there should be a change in the orbits of the planets from what they appear to be -even if that meant we could minimize the degree of change in the laws.
(The concept of different domains of change is evidently vague, but I shall make no further effort to reduce that vagueness in the present paper.)
• It is of the second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region of approximate match of particular fact.
•
It is of the third importance to maximize the regular uniformity of the divergence from actuality in any given domain.
It is of little or no importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region of perfect match of particular fact.
These criteria are of particular importance if demi-Humean and fine-tuned worlds are to be further from @ than either Humean or species  worlds. In something like the same manner, one can see how a species  world fares better than a fine-tuned world. A species  world is capable of being a perfect 'facsimile' of a deterministic world. It would simply be a world where, for every particular fact in @ involving properties P, Q, R, etc., there are corresponding facts involving space-invading properties P , Q , R , etc. A highly uniform substitution of properties is possible.
Fine-tuned worlds, on the other hand, may be reasonable facsimiles, but will have occasional glitches. For instance, the fine-tuned world where N 2 has gristlecausing powers in circumstances C is consequently a world where there is some gristle in my fridge (or there is some extra phenomenon which is preventing gristle from manifesting) while in the actual world, even after ignoring the global property swap required for the fine-tuning, nothing corresponds to said gristle. This is a non-uniform divergence from @. Hence we have some principled reason to say that species  worlds will at least in many contexts be closer than fine-tuned worlds, for they can provide a uniform divergence from actuality throughout a very large region indeed.
Similar reasoning applies to the choice between Humean and demi-Humean worlds. Having made the change in the domain of laws such that some laws are mere regularities, it is important to maximize the uniformity of this change. One obvious way to achieve that uniformity is by rendering all of the laws mere regularities, which is a Humean world.
The second criterion is an important constraint on the third. I take it that
If it turns out that Queen Elizabeth is a robot, then it will turn out that all humans are robots is false, but if the third criterion is not suitably constrained, it might direct us to effect the change from human to robot in an all too pervasive fashion.
Having given at least a first sketch of a similarity metric for conditionals like (), I note that there are other ways the world might turn out such that a steak  might have been in my fridge. For instance, the properties instantiated in a typical steak might all be capable of space-invasion, though the other properties are identical with the properties of @.
Or consider a slightly different possibility. A world just like the fine-tuned world described above, except that being N 2 does not have a deterministic power to bring about gristle in circumstances C. Rather, it has a very small chance propensity to cause gristle. Moreover, all of the other property instances in the 'steakexpecting' region of my fridge have similar small chance propensities to bring about the required states-of-affairs to constitute a steak in my fridge.¹⁸ I do not pretend that adjudicating relative similarity of these worlds is a straightforward business. Perhaps the uniformity of change criterion holds them to be further away than the worlds already considered, but perhaps the first criterion of minimising domains of change admits them. In either case, however, I see little reason to be concerned by such worlds, for in both I take it to be true that if I had a steak in my fridge, I would cook it for dinner.
I conclude that, although the semantics of 'if it turns out that' conditionals could be developed in much greater detail, there is some reason to be optimistic that refined counterfactuals such as () will at least sometimes be true.
The remaining test for the proposed theory is whether it will deal with explicit counterlegals. I will not labour the point, as the hard work has all been done by now. A counterfactual of the form 'If mass had been governed by an inverse cube law of gravitation, . . .' may be charitably refined as:
If it turns out that mass could have been governed by an inverse cube law of gravitation, then had it been so governed, the planets would have had very different orbits.
One sort of way the world could turn out such that mass could have been governed by an inverse cube law is a schmass-world. If such a world turned out to be actual, though, then it would be true that mass obeys an inverse cube law. I take it that this does not capture the presupposition of the person who entertains a counterlegal.
Rather, they are supposing that the world has turned out such that mass obeys something other than an inverse cube law, and yet could have obeyed such a law.
Humean worlds and demi-Humean worlds exemplify ways the world could have turned out such that the speaker's presupposition is true. Again, for the rea-. I am grateful to Barker and an anonymous referee for pointing out this sort of example.

sons discussed above, I suspect that our intuitive understanding of such conditionals pulls us towards the Humean world first, for it constitutes a more uniform change from the actual.
From a Humean world, the inner counterfactual is free to range over worlds where the laws are different, because laws will have turned out to be mere contingent regularities. Very likely then, the consequent will be true. Even if not, the counterfactual will at least be non-vacuous. Mission accomplished.
 Conclusion
This paper has pursued a particularly narrow target: that of reconciling a Dispositionalist metaphysical thesis about laws and properties with a realist approach to counterfactual discourse. One might reasonably ask whether the elaborate contortions that have been required to achieve this reconciliation are not evidence for the falsity of either Dispositionalism or of realism about counterfactuals.
To properly address that question would require discussion of all the claimed benefits of the Dispositionalist thesis: a task which is beyond the scope of this paper. Despite failing to resolve the debate between Dispositionalists and their opponents, however, this paper has sketched a technique which may be of use in other debates. If we accept the Kripkean intuitions about the necessary a posteriori, then we must be prepared to accept that the traditional philosophical tool, a priori reflection, is not the royal road to modality. Philosophers must yield some territory to the scientists. And this means that objections analogous to the problem of vacuous counterlegals can be raised against anyone. We may, without realising it, be attempting to refer to metaphysical impossibilities. The problem is therefore not merely a skeleton in the closet of Dispositionalists -it is a problem for any neo-Kripkean. The strategy of charitable refinement, then, whereby our false presuppositions are turned into the antecedents of 'if it turns out' conditionals, may be of use in a great variety of philosophical contexts.¹⁹ . Thanks to John Bigelow, Patrick Emerton, Laura Schroeter, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions concerning this paper. Particular thanks are due to Stephen Barker for his very thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
